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I appreciate the time Tom Barney has spent reading and writing about my work:
his review of my book Language and Literature 2 { 1 ) and now his response to
my article Language and Literature 3 (2). Barney is sympathetic with the
general thrust of my work, but he objects to many of my suggestions.
Barney’s biggest objection to my work derives from his philosophical
orientation. Barney is a behaviourist. He assumes that the better part of rhythmic
experience derives transparently from (1) convention or (2) the quality of an
external stimulus. Therefore he rejects out-of-hand my ‘natural’, ’top-down’,
’cognitive’ approach to rhythmic experience. To respond with a ’strong’ beat,
Barney claims, we nurst be stimulated with a ’strong’ syllable. To experience
rhythmic hierarchies, we nrust be exposed to language with similar hierarchical
ordering. To claim anything else is ’simply ridiculous.’
The relative contribution of nature and nurture to human experience is
complex. Our rhythmic capabilities derive from both sources. Therefore
Barney’s out-of-hand dismissal of my ’cognitive’ approach to rhythm is
philosophically naive. There is nothing ’ridiculous’ about claiming that we have
certain innate rhythmical capabilities; that rhythms, as we experience them, have
certain canonical shapes; and that this rhythmic experience diverges widely from
the stimuli that elicits it. The value of this suggestion comes from its explanatory
power, its ability to account for our rhythmic intuitions; and if it is to be
rejected, it must be rejected on these grounds, not by philosophical dogmatism
parading as argument. In both my article and my book, I document extensively
the explanatory power of this cognitive approach to verse rhythm. There has
never been a comparably organised and explanatory account of these matters. If
Barney has in hand such a rival account, then I will be very excited to hear it.
But at present he gives no evidence of this whatsoever (i.e. he scans no poems;
he represents no rhythmic intuitions).
Barney’s next biggest objection derives from his (different) aims. Barney’s
major concerns are (1) to describe the physical/linguistic structure of individual
performances of the text and (2) to validate and stabilise rhythmic interpretation
in terms of those physical/linguistic descriptions. My major concern is to
provide detailed rhythmic representations that can be used productively in verse
criticism, history, and theory.
Barney is right that I do not establish the phonetic sources of my intonational
intuitions, but this lack has little bearing on my aims or claims. My work on
verse rhythm is based on my rhythmic intuitions, not the phonetic sources of
those intuitions, and it is evident that many rhythmic intuitions are only
obliquely represented in the phonetic record (e.g. the preference for strong-beat
early in metre and all of prolongation). ,
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Barney’s claim that my intonational segmentations are ’dubious’ because not
’certain* both misunderstands my claims and extends his (promised!) results
beyond their scope. The only way he can refute my intonational claims is to
show that they are either impossible or unpreferred. It is no refutation to point
out that they could be otherwise. My theory of grouping does not
dictate/prescribe hearings; it motivates preferences. I recognise repeatedly that
rhythmic hearing can vary from time to time (in the experience of one person),
from person to person (in one interpretational community), and from
interpretational community to interpretational community (e.g. between
experienced readers of poetry and the poetically naive).
The logic of Barney’s argument here is questionable. How can I experience
something, prefer it, demonstrate why I prefer it, and use it to explain many
things about other aspects of my experience, when, in the end, that something is
impossible? Traditional approaches to verse experience (e.g. foot-substitution
prosody) have been inadequate because they have provided weak, partial, and
contradictory accounts of verse experience (Cureton 1992: 11-117), not because
they have provided strong, complete, and consistent accounts that are (really)
impossible. If Barney is to maintain this second objection, he would also need to
explain how others both during and since the writing of my book have been able
to experience what I have claimed. There is already evidence that others
experience just what I do and, in doing so, can use my theory as a powerfully
productive critical tool.
Barney also objects to my representation of metre. I claim that our metrical
response to language parallels our metrical response to music - i.e. that
linguistic metres are also ’natural’, unsegmented (i.e. un-‘footed’), steeply
hierarchical, afterbeating, oppositionally related to grouping, obliquely related to
the phenomenal surface of the text, and so forth. Barney rejects this view
without argument, presumably for a more traditional theory, in which linguistic
metres are conventional, flat, footed, upbeating phrasal norms embodied fairly
directly in phonetic detail.
I am sympathetic with this objection. My ability to fully experience and
analyse metre also came late and with great difficulty. Within language study,
there is an enormously long and pervasive theoretical tradition that regards
metre as a repetitively shaped and segmented voicing, that is, that conflates
metre and phrasing rather than bringing forward their ’natural’ (and principled)
differences. This theoretical tradition &dquo;(together with many other matters, e.g. our
historical distance from a poetry in which metre is rhythmically ’dominant’)
consistently distracts those who work on these issues from even accessing the
basic perceptions needed to develop a workable theory of metre for language.
The fact that has been missed by the theoretical tradition is that metre is
basically gesturalltactile rather than vocallaural. Its locus is in the body, not the
voice/ear. This locus in the body gives metre a distinct cognitive source and
expressive range. By trying to approach verse through the phonetic record,
Barney distances himself from these bodily reactions.
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Once we distinguish metre from vocal figuration (i.e. from phrasing), it is not
at all unreasonable to claim that metrical onsets to even vocally weak phrases
are preferably experienced as large rhythmic gestures, which then oscillate in a
decaying pattern until exhaustion, reinvigoration, or termination. Given this
perspective, it is also not unreasonable to suggest that this bodily gesturing is
used to organise larger metrical spans: the hemistich, the line, the stanza, the
poetic form, and so forth. As I have recently outlined in some detail (Cureton
manuscript, forthcoming a, and forthcoming b), this account of ’hypermetrical’
gesturing can explain a range of previously unexplained facts about both the
standard inventory of our traditional verse forms and the interactions between
these verse forms and particular phrasal gestures. Most of my explicit thinking
and writing on these issues has been done just recently and has not yet been
published, but I illustrate and discuss many of these metrical effects in the 150
pages of explicit analysis I present in chapter 5 of my book (Cureton 1992:
277-422).
As with his other objections, Barney’s response to these metrical claims are
weak: undemonstrated, incoherent, or just wrong. He spends most of his time
claiming (1) that hypermetrical beating in music is just conventional and (2) that
language, therefore, cannot be hypermetrical (because it lacks this convention).
But he has no evidence for the first claim and therefore no logical justification
for the second (which depends on the first).
Barney then goes on to reiterate Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s claim that metre is
relatively local in structure compared to phrasing, certainly more local than I
claim for verse, even though Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s metrical responses in
their standard examples, such as Mozart’s G minor symphony, have almost
exactly the number of levels I claim for verse: six (Lerdahl and Jackendoff
1983: 250-77). Recently Jonathan Kramer (1988: 81-136) has also argued that
Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s hypermetrical gesturing is far too weak. Kramer claims
that he responds to the G minor symphony with nine levels of metrical beating,
a hypermetrical span than covers almost 50 measures. In his other analyses,
Kramer claims metrical gesturing in response to music of eleven levels covering
spans of almost 200 (!) measures (for example, see Kramer’s analysis of his
metrical response to the first movement of Beethoven’s String Quartet in F
Major, pp. 123-36). Given that phrasal organisation can embrace an entire
text/piece, such extended metrical gesturing is still relatively ’local’ compared to
phrasal hearing. But contrary to Barney’s unsupported claims and innuendos, the
extent of this gesturing can be considerable both for music and language,
certainly long enough to embrace the seven levels I claim for the sonnet. The
extent of Kramer’s metrical response and the differences between his response
and Lerdahl and Jackendoff’s response also argue strongly against any view of
~ mu’sical metre as (1) coventional or (2) derivable transparently from the phonetic
record.
Barney also objects to my linguistic sources, claiming that my unquestioning
use of the results of the metrical phonologists overlooks the weaknesses in those
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results. This objection is also unfounded. As I specify repeatedly in my book, I
am not adopting without alteration the view of the metrical phonologists
(Cureton 1992: 256-57). The hierarchy that I posit for grouping at the
intonational level and below differs in various ways from their prosodic
hierarchy (for example, I omit the level ’word’). Throughout my book, I also
point out repeatedly how my interest in rhythm differs from the metrical
phonologist’s interest in phonological organisation in language and versification
in poetry. The levels in my hierarchy are derived from my intuitions of rhythmic
shaping, not from evidence of phonological organisation. In fact, I explicitly
suggest (1992: 257) that it is more likely that constraints on grouping condition
the prosodic hierarchy than the other way around. How am I trusting linguists
unquestioningly if (1) no linguists have ever constructed a phrasal hierarchy
exactly as I do and (2) no linguists have ever suggested a system of preference
rules for phrasal hearing that even remotely resembles the system of rules I
suggest in my book? I quote:
Given the preferential nature of grouping and the diverse functions of
prosodic organization in language, this does not claim that the prosodic
hierarchy is a rhythmic form. It just claims that the rhythmic effects of the
prosodic hierarchy are part of what constrains [rhythm’s] structural
organisation.
(Cureton 1992: 256)
Finally, Barney objects to the explanatory power of my theory, claiming that the
theory cannot mediate between the text and the phrasal preferences I report (e.g.
in response to the example I use in my article, the second quatrain of
Shakespeare’s Sonnet 29). This objection is also unjustified. In my article, it was
not my aim to motivate my claims about grouping preference. The focus of the
article was on rhythmic representation (i.e. a definition of rhythm). These
preferential motivations for my hearings can easily be given, however.
I prefer to hear ’more rich’ as stronger than ’in hope’ because ’in hope’ is old
information (GPRI Information): the first quatrian is about the sin of despair-
lost hope. ’More rich’ is also strong informationally; it indicates comparative
degree (GPR 1 Information). This hearing also produces an amphibrachic tone
unit that is rhythmically parallel (GPRI6 Unity) (I) to the tone unit in the same
position in line 6 (’like him with friends possessed’) and (2) to the tone unit in
the first position in line 8 (’With what I most enjoy’), a tone unit that also has a
comparative (’most’), this time one that is unambiguously the peak of its tone
unit because it contrasts minimally with another comparative (’least’). I also find
that much of the rhythmic felicity in the quatrain as a whole {GPRI7 Schemes)
results from the play of the three waved amphibrachs at the tone unit level with
the strong-final (and dramatically foregrounded) anapests (’this man’s art / and
that man’s scope’) at the phonological phrase level in line 7. The demotion of
’more’ by the metre also foregrounds ’rich’, delivering it after a formal change
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(GPR5 Return). I agree with Barney that the various paired conjoins in the
quatrain (’this man’s art and that man’s scope’ etc.) are very balanced
informationally. But I read these units with final peaks, first, because all
rhythmic parallels to these units have this shape (GPR16 Unity) and, second,
because an iambic shape is canonical form for a group and therefore is the
default in these situations (GPR3 End-focus). Contrary to Barney’s claims, such
principled motivations for phrasal hearings are exactly what my theory of
grouping makes possible.
I appreciate Barney’s interest and energy and look forward to the publication
of his own work. But at this point his own results are hypothetical, and his
objections to mine unfounded.
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